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RACISM, WHEN IT STILL WAS THE ENGLISH & AFRIKANER
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Cedric Offline
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RACISM, WHEN IT STILL WAS THE ENGLISH & AFRIKANER

INTRO TO MY THINKING:

The following articles allow me to see just how developed the black farmer was in crop production, specifically maize.

We reflect on the impact of the Anglo-Boer War had on the white farmer, many loosing their farms, not only through the war conflict, but through financial institutions, driven by the wealthy needs to secure the land, repossessing the farmers property. These farmers, becoming know as the 'bywooners' through the process of needing to work for the wealthy farmer, and living on their property. (Bywooner - close to squatter although rather a family living on the farm and working for their master.)

These articles reflect on the tensions and conflict that developed between the system of bywooner and the black sharecropper family who shared this space, living on the farm, planting maize crops, and paying the farmer 50% of his crop.

The bywooner was mainly a pastoral farmer, where the sharecropper specialised in the production of maize.

I extract a few comments in these articles that may encourage the reader to satisfy their personal understanding on whether our black brothers were a group of substance.

I
Quote:n South Africa’s largest maize growing area in 1914, the Orange Free State, only 2.25% of the province’s area was planted to the crop, mostly by black sharecroppers.40 Only with the arrival of the American white dent variety “Hickory King” and its local descendants (such as Salisbury White) did white farmers take to maize as a major cereal crop, and then only after black African farmers had begun to exploit its usefulness and profitability in feeding growing mining centres.

Quote:Chiefly, however, the fear was economic. It was the gendered and class-bound fear of competition between the white male small farmers or bywoners and black families

Quote:Well, gentlemen, I have seven bywoners on the farm and I've seven black families, and I get from one of those black families what I cannot get from the seven bywoners together. And so are you going to ask me to take food out of my mouth?

Quote:The majority [of farmers] prefer to work with blacks rather than with whites, first because the latter demand a larger share of the profits, and secondly because they are more independent and less amenable to discipline and cannot be set to perform the same work as natives.

Quote:The concerns about blacks were not only symbolic, but predicated on a harsh material reality: the loss of control over black labour and the competition black producers were beginning to present. Black Peril thus meant something different to the poor white farmers of the north-eastern Orange Free State and south-western Transvaal on the eve of the Rebellion: it meant something related to the issue of class and race — the erosion of both white patronage and the old racialised paternal
order. Thus the rural fear was that of competition — that the black man and his Malherbe noted that his research in the first half of this century was profoundly influenced by what he saw as a striking comparison between the rural poor whites in South Africa and the United States of America, particularly in terms of racial attitudes. ó8 In the USA, attacks on black men in the form of lynching, as a manifestation of the fears of Black Peril, was a crime of small towns and the countryside, and it was clearly a mixture of social and economic anxieties. He quoted Walter White who noted: `Lynching is much more an expression of Southern fear of Negro progress than of Negro crime.' The poorer the white, the more he or she clung to their whiteness, within economic constraints. This begs for comparative analysis, because in South Africa, populist rhetoric manipulated anxieties over whiteness in order to paper over the ruptures in Boer society and to focus bitterness against the government. The men who listened to De Wet's racialised oratory were those who had been alienated by developing rural capitalism and the competitive advantage of the black family as labouring unit. De Wet's paternal relationship with his poor white seigneuries allowed him to promote this anxiety at black oorheersing. There were indignant protests at the vision of whites having to compete with blacks for resources and patronage from landowners.
The concerns about blacks were not only symbolic, but predicated on a harsh material reality: the loss of control over black labour and the competition black producers were beginning to present. Black Peril thus meant something different to the poor white farmers of the north-eastern Orange Free State and south-western Transvaal on the eve of the Rebellion: it meant something related to the issue of class and race — the erosion of both white patronage and the old racialised paternal
order. Thus the rural fear was that of competition — that the black man and his family could and would out-produce him — and that the presence of the more economically competitive black squatter family was more welcome by the Boer landed gentry. To a much more limited degree, it incorporated the sexual element of the more characteristically urban hysteria, in that it fostered concern over urbanising poor white women debasing the volk through miscegenation. Both symbolic and material concerns were articulated by populist leaders, who used them to disguise fissures in white society, and to motivate people to rebel against the capitalising state which, reacting to the new needs of the mercantile and mining sector, would not control black labour in older ways. This contributes to our understanding of the geographic specificity of the Rebellion, and helps to explain the class of person who got involved. Thus, it could be said that the Rebellion was, at least, partly about trying to retain what it meant to be a white man in a changing world.


I reserve further comment on this English, Afrikaner, Bywooner, Sharecropper issue and rely on the reader to read and anticipate where the BC, Black Cedric, is being taken by this insight into his heritage:



I go back to the research material and start with
Maize and Grace:
History, Corn, and Africa’s New Landscapes, 1500 - 1999:

James McCann - Boston University:

This report covers many aspects of our Maize history, what attracted me is this extract from page 256:

It seems that black South African farmers embraced the floury and flint maizes on their farms long before white settlers did. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, white South African farmers still argued that maize was a “Kaffir” crop, with little commercial value. In South Africa’s largest maize growing area in 1914, the Orange Free State, only 2.25% of the province’s area was planted to the crop, mostly by black sharecroppers.40 Only with the arrival of the American white dent variety “Hickory King” and its local descendants (such as Salisbury White) did white farmers take to maize as a major cereal crop, and then only after black African farmers had begun to exploit its usefulness and profitability in feeding growing mining centres.

What this comment tells us is that the black sharecroppers were not only the main producers of maize, but that they developed the food chain for the staple food supply into the mines, industry, railroad for the cheap labourers.

Let us scrutinise the
"SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORICAL JOURNAL"

The 'Five Shilling Rebellion': Rural White Male]
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:[/url]
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~c...t793706093
The 'Five Shilling Rebellion': Rural White Male Anxiety and the 1914 Boer Rebellion
Sandra Swart - University of Stellenbosch,

Extract:
This article hopes to achieve two things: to contribute to considerations of elements of white agrarian anxieties as the old order was replaced by the modernising state, and to explore a facet of the 1914 Rebellion that has hitherto been overlooked.
.................................. This article attempts to supplement the understanding of the social context of the movement provided, with a particular emphasis on Black Peril and social anxiety.

Extract:

Outbreaks of anxiety — here we employ Hunt's conception of anxiety as a `psychic condition of heightened sensitivity to some perceived threat, risk, peril or danger' — about black men and their potential threat occur at intervals in South Africa's history, and have been analysed in various ways.' `Black Peril' was a recurring cry, and scares arose in Natal in the 1870s and in 1886, in the Cape, Transvaal and Natal in 1902-1903, and throughout the whole country in 1906-1908 and 1911-1912. The infrequency of assaults did not matter; the crime was of such symbolic importance that a single, ill-corroborated incident could raise a public uproar. 10 The scares did not end in those early decades." For the urban English-speaker, Black Peril was symbolised by black male lust for white women. 1z It has been argued that Black Peril operated as an emotional signifier catalysed by psychological tension, economic recession, political uncertainty and industrial upheaval, sexual jealousy over `the seduction of white women by black men', or alarm over a possible `native' rebellion; Cornwell has contended that the white woman's body symbolised the ethnic body, using Fanon's notion that the `individual body and the ethnic body are one'. 13 In the patriarchal construction of sexual intercourse, the male is dominant over a subordinate female: the horror of Black Peril was the domination of a member of the dominant race, in an act of insurrection as much as rape. Keegan has demonstrated compellingly that `white masculinity' (which was perceived to be under threat) was indivisible from the exercise of racial power, and consequently concern over black sexual appeal or predation and white women's seditious sexuality fuelled crusades against anticipated black (sexual) aggression. 14 Etherington has argued that Black Peril was symptomatic of broader political anxiety,' while Van Onselen has established that Black Peril scares occurred in times of acute tension in the political economy. He has shown convincingly that the 1906-1908 scares coincided with an economic depression, the transfer of power by the British reconstruction administration to the
Het Volk government, and that the pre-First World War scares occurred concurrently with political instability and white industrial action.' But whatever the underlying cause, the anxiety usually concerned (sometimes consensual but generally non-consensual) sex between single black men and white women.

**The platteland Peril was a different kind of fear. This anxiety certainly contained and was articulated in powerful symbols similar to the more commonly discussed urban Black Peril scares. The platteland Peril was, for example, a metaphor for the loss of control of elements of state power, and it represented the dread of sexual contamination with the concomitant bio-social degeneracy of the poor white. Chiefly, however, the fear was economic. It was the gendered and class-bound fear of competition between the white male small farmers or bywoners and black families.

State and south-western Transvaal, a black family labouring on his land simply made more financial sense than a white bywoner family." Keegan reveals a telling incident, two years before De Wet's court case and the outbreak of the Rebellion. The Prime Minister, Louis Botha, who had been visiting rural constituencies, was asked by a farmer whether it was right that there were black people living in ease while hundreds of poor whites were in dire straits, to which Botha replied in the negative.

Another farmer then stood up and said:
Quote:Well, gentlemen, I have seven bywoners on the farm and I've seven black families, and I get from one of those black families what I cannot get from the seven bywoners together. And so are you going to ask me to take food out of my mouth?


The sympathy of the crowd was manifestly not with him and cries of `Donner horn!' were heard. 18 Competition with black cash-crop tenants was difficult for the bywoner. 19 Poorer, landless Boers often lacked experience in cultivation, while many black families already had arable skills.20 The chief obstacle was the bywoner father's reluctance to use family labour. The head of the family required, instead, access to black labour.

Emelia Pooe remembered how her family competed with a white bywoner and his family. After a year, the latter was compelled to move on:
With us blacks, I would go out into the fields with my husband and perhaps with my children if they were already old enough. With the Boers as `bywoners' it was different. Normally their wives could not go out into the fields to hoe. The husband would have to do the hoeing alone. Or sometimes he would take out money to pay for whomever he could hire.21

Women in black sharecropping families did the hoeing and weeding, and played a role in the threshing and reaping, whereas white men were reluctant to use white female labour; and child labour, although utilised in the fields, was increasingly frowned upon. Moreover, the white bywoner male did not normally use kinship networks to establish co-operative labour arrangements.

Bywoners were also more resistant to placing themselves under the authority of the landlord.
Whites also required cash rather than payment in crops or livestock. The 1908 Orange River Colony Natives Administration Commission noted:

The majority [of farmers] prefer to work with blacks rather than with whites, first because the latter demand a larger share of the profits, and secondly because they are more independent and less amenable to discipline and cannot be set to perform the same work as natives.22

Agrarian Relations Between Black and White

Prior to the South African War, the bywoner still had an important role in the pastoral rural economy. Anti-squatting legislation limited the number of black families to five per farm in the Orange Free State. 23 In the south-western Transvaal and north-eastern Orange Free State, bywoners had been useful on pastoral farms — overseeing isolated cattle and transport-riding. There was an impetus towards cultivation, but pastoralism remained predominant in the south-western Transvaal prior to the South African War. 24 Pastoral areas were also more unappealing to black peasants, so there was a perennial labour shortage which the bywoner could fill. The pastoral farmers in the south and west supported anti-squatting legislation, believing forced labour dispersal would increase the supply in the dry regions. In the arable districts of the north and east, however, which were to become prime rebel country, landowners were already beginning to find excuses to get rid of bywoners and their families. The latter were regarded as less productive than black peasants and had larger cash requirements. Black squatter settlements led to fissures in white society: anti-squatting legislation was propelled by the mass of small farmers, tenants and bywoners who were concerned not only with the labour supply but also with their own security, status, social standing and access to land. There was an upsurge in resentment against the independent African peasantry, because of the need to compete for markets and patronage. The geography of the Rebellion is largely explained by the economic situation, helping the historian to find the answer as to why the Rebellion was limited to only a few northern Orange Free State and western Transvaal districts. 25 Part of the answer lies in the fact that bywoners were being replaced more ruthlessly by white land owners, and the platteland Black Peril was a more powerful concept under those conditions — which was in turn manipulated by the rebel leadership, which emphasised the eluctance of the State to take any real measures against the process. 26
As discussed, the end of the South African War saw black peasants better equipped to deal with the post-war economy than the small white farmer, after the extensive devastation of farms, livestock and lack of cash. By contrast, the black peasantry had accumulated stock and farming equipment. 27 Many black people moved out of the crowded Basutoland at the end of the war, across the Caledon river and into the Orange River Colony, where larger white farmers welcomed black families with livestock and equipment. The increase in the black population in the territory was noted by white farmers, and black sharecropping became a primary feature of farming in its arable districts.' Initially it was accepted as a temporary measure until white farming could get on its feet again, but it took root in the soil of the platteland.
During the period of reconstruction, 1902-1910, after attempts at establishing a class of British yeomen farmers failed, the administration tried to co-opt the Boer landed class for collaboration. Consequently settler capitalism was promoted over peasant production, black and white. 29 Free black squatter-peasant communities interfered with the distribution of labour resources. The huge amount of capital injected into post-war reconstruction (leading to new equipment, railway extension and experimental agricultural techniques) was heavily weighted towards the arable farming sector. Lord Milner' s administration had been against tenancy, both sharecropping and labour, and appeared determined to transform black tenants into wage labourers, primarily to free labour for the gold-mines, and to compel squatters to become wage-labourers on capitalising farms. 3° The move towards capital intensive farming was slow, but was facilitated by the state with easy capital and credit, as the massive market of the Witwatersrand stimulated a cash-crop economy, and also required wage-labourers. The 1912 Land Bank Act deleted all provisions for loans to non-landowners. 31 The South African Native Affairs Commission had represented an attempt at social engineering to eliminate tenancy, allowing labour tenancy only as a bridge to wage labour. To this end, bills were introduced to both the Transvaal and Orange River Colony legislatures in 1908, designed to prevent black tenancy other than as labourers. These bills were not implemented, but they were forerunners of the anti-squatting clauses of the 1913 Natives Land Act. 32

The Land Act laid down that the only legal form of rent payment by black tenants to white landlords was to be labour service. 33 Pre-1913 sharecropping had made the black man a `partner' of the landowner, but the new Master and Servant legislation of 1913 was an attempt to compel autonomous black peasant families to become wage labourers. 34 This benefited the labour-craving, progressive farmers, for whom the bargaining power of black tenants proved an obstacle to productive farming. The Act was not strictly enforced, however, with few prosecutions. Indeed, through the second decade of the twentieth century, there was actually a growth in share-cropping, encouraging possibilities for young black farmers.35 The disparagement of `kaffir farmers' and landlords who let squatters `infest' their lands increased — ironically both on the part of progressive capitalising white farmers who wanted the erstwhile squatters as wage labourers, and by bywoners who wanted their place on the farms as tenants. But the shrillness of the demands indicates that they were not being met. 36 Wage labour was scarce in the western Transvaal and the government was reluctant to enforce legislation that would disrupt the black peasantry's major agricultural production, since white farmers alone could not produce enough for the growing market on the Witwatersrand. 37
The 1913 Land Act was thus, in essence, an intervention by the state on behalf of progressive, capitalising white farmers, especially in the Orange Free State. 38 Not only was sharecropping maintained and the state's efforts to replace it ineffectual, but even had it been successful it would not have returned the bywoner to the land. Rather, black families would have remained, albeit as wage labourers. The Act did not bring the salvation envisioned by the dispossessed bywoner — instead of returning him and his family to the land, it merely facilitated the use of black wage labourers by wealthier white land owners, although in many ways the Act was impracticable. White bywoners became increasingly frustrated at its impotence in returning them to the land 39 Rural poor whites — the landless, the bywoners, the small-holders on sub-divided plots — had originally greeted the new administration with some relief; now they were disillusioned. Instead of the reunion between men and the land they ploughed, an event to which they had been looking forward, the old solidarity of Boer society disintegrated rapidly along the fissures of capitalist property relations. 40 Resentment was almost inevitably visited on black squatters, mixed up with bitterness towards black labour on the larger farms denied to the white bywoners. The indignation at peasant independence was tied up in the class hostilities fissuring white society, between bywoners and heerenboeren (landlord farmers), but populism and class rivalry focused on black labour.

HERE WE SKIP A FEW PAGES AND MOVE TO THE CONCLUSIONS:

Malherbe noted that his research in the first half of this century was profoundly influenced by what he saw as a striking comparison between the rural poor whites in South Africa and the United States of America, particularly in terms of racial attitudes. ó8 In the USA, attacks on black men in the form of lynching, as a manifestation of the fears of Black Peril, was a crime of small towns and the countryside, and it was clearly a mixture of social and economic anxieties. He quoted Walter White who noted: `Lynching is much more an expression of Southern fear of Negro progress than of Negro crime.' The poorer the white, the more he or she clung to their whiteness, within economic constraints. This begs for comparative analysis, because in South Africa, populist rhetoric manipulated anxieties over whiteness in order to paper over the ruptures in Boer society and to focus bitterness against the government. The men who listened to De Wet's racialised oratory were those who had been alienated by developing rural capitalism and the competitive advantage of the black family as labouring unit. De Wet's paternal relationship with his poor white seigneuries allowed him to promote this anxiety at black oorheersing. There were indignant protests at the vision of whites having to compete with blacks for resources and patronage from landowners.

The concerns about blacks were not only symbolic, but predicated on a harsh material reality: the loss of control over black labour and the competition black producers were beginning to present. Black Peril thus meant something different to the poor white farmers of the north-eastern Orange Free State and south-western Transvaal on the eve of the Rebellion: it meant something related to the issue of class and race — the erosion of both white patronage and the old racialised paternal
order. Thus the rural fear was that of competition — that the black man and his Malherbe noted that his research in the first half of this century was profoundly influenced by what he saw as a striking comparison between the rural poor whites in South Africa and the United States of America, particularly in terms of racial attitudes. ó8 In the USA, attacks on black men in the form of lynching, as a manifestation of the fears of Black Peril, was a crime of small towns and the countryside, and it was clearly a mixture of social and economic anxieties. He quoted Walter White who noted: `Lynching is much more an expression of Southern fear of Negro progress than of Negro crime.' The poorer the white, the more he or she clung to their whiteness, within economic constraints. This begs for comparative analysis, because in South Africa, populist rhetoric manipulated anxieties over whiteness in order to paper over the ruptures in Boer society and to focus bitterness against the government. The men who listened to De Wet's racialised oratory were those who had been alienated by developing rural capitalism and the competitive advantage of the black family as labouring unit. De Wet's paternal relationship with his poor white seigneuries allowed him to promote this anxiety at black oorheersing. There were indignant protests at the vision of whites having to compete with blacks for resources and patronage from landowners.
The concerns about blacks were not only symbolic, but predicated on a harsh material reality: the loss of control over black labour and the competition black producers were beginning to present. Black Peril thus meant something different to the poor white farmers of the north-eastern Orange Free State and south-western Transvaal on the eve of the Rebellion: it meant something related to the issue of class and race — the erosion of both white patronage and the old racialised paternal
order. Thus the rural fear was that of competition — that the black man and his family could and would out-produce him — and that the presence of the more economically competitive black squatter family was more welcome by the Boer landed gentry. To a much more limited degree, it incorporated the sexual element of the more characteristically urban hysteria, in that it fostered concern over urbanising poor white women debasing the volk through miscegenation. Both symbolic and material concerns were articulated by populist leaders, who used them to disguise fissures in white society, and to motivate people to rebel against the capitalising state which, reacting to the new needs of the mercantile and mining sector, would not control black labour in older ways. This contributes to our understanding of the geographic specificity of the Rebellion, and helps to explain the class of person who got involved. Thus, it could be said that the Rebellion was, at least, partly about trying to retain what it meant to be a white man in a changing world.

This was part of a world view that was seeping away. Even after his arrest, General de Wet made a desperate attempt to retain control of a mental paradigm in which the white male was hegemonic. On his way to prison, De Wet was put in a horse-drawn trap, driven by a coloured police constable. 69 As the tin-houses of Vryburg came into view, he made a last attempt to cling to his position, his place in the hierarchy of colour and race, by trying to reward his gaoler as he would a servant. He turned to the constable and, after feeling his empty pockets, pulled out his tobacco-pouch, shook an ounce or two into the palm of the driver and said to his captor: `Well driven, my boy.' 70

I include a second article related to this situation:

South African Historical Journal
[url=http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t793706093
]Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:[/url]

'Desperate Men': The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty
SANDRA SWART
a Magdalen College, Oxford

‘Rebellion does not seem such a serious thing to desperate men ...’ (Patrick Duncan)’
The year 1914 saw ordinary men go into rebellion against their government 2 Twelve years after the end of the South Afi-ican War, a handful of men in the rural backwaters of the south-western Transvaal and north-eastem Free State tried to overthrow the young South African state. The rebel leaders mobilised their followers with the rhetoric of Republican nostalgia, using the seductively refashioned images of the Republican struggle in the South African War to foster rebellion. Out of the almost 12 000 men who took part in the uprising, only 281 were prosecuted as leaders, the rest were considered rank and file. The leadership was composed of wealthy landowners, comfortable farmers, a few civil servants, a few builders and contractors. The bulk of the rebels, however, was made up of poor whites. Previous historiographical discussions of the Rebellion have tended to focus largely on the upper echelon and extrapolated a narrow view of rebel motivation from this source This article explores the motives of the rank and file for going into rebellion, particularly the ‘desperate classes’. It traces the economic crisis of the years prior to 1914 that led to the creation of a class of poor whites, and their increasing loss of faith in the state’s efforts towards amelioration. The discussion delineates the way in which the economic crisis impacted on their identity as fathers, as patriarchs, as farmers, as men and what they hoped to regain by this rebellion.

After Union, the little man felt increasingly aggrieved by the State’s actions. There were initiatives to revive work as transport-riders or self-employed work on the saltpans and diamond diggings. Poor whites often had to capitulate, at a cost to their traditional lifestyle. Urbanisation was a part of the poor white’s new life: in 1899, 2 .6 per cent of people who could crudely be classified as Afrikaners lived in urban areas; by 1911, the figure had reached 24 per cent.70 The trek to the cities was a joumey to the mines, railways, and factories where they saw themselves working at unfamiliar jobs, taking orders like black people, living in squalid conditions adjacent to black shanty towns, and having to speak a foreign language - English - like a conquered race.

Poverty was to have an enormous influence on the outlook and political ambitions of the rural Afrikaner." The stigma of poverty was attached to the Afrikaans family with English social discourse portraying the Afrikaner male as the backward railway worker, the crude policeman and illiterate station-master.~ State relief measures only served to compound these stereotypes and visit further shame and resentment upon those facing such a fate. To replace this, Afrikaners had to build a new identity, a new image of themselves. Poverty meant more than merely a low self-esteem. Poverty became part of the political discourse and a powerful mobilising factor, for both National Party and for Rebellion. The notion of the uchteruitgang [regression] of the Afrikaner relative to
English-speakers and blacks was variously a grim prophecy, apolitical weapon, a social evil and a routine method of drawing an angry crowd in any rural constituency.

Poor white men tried to resist efforts to change their life-style and that of their families. The imperialist overgroup wished to see a proletarian work ethic instilled in the poor white. It was repeatedly bemoaned that bywoners were not prepared to do‘Kaffir work’: the depressed class were still reluctant to let their daughters enter domestic labour and their sons to take up agricultural labour. Th e rebel male was faced with the loss of his identity through the undermining of his status of patriarch. This had resulted from his removal from the land, being forced to become an urban labourer or becoming a marginalised and scorned bywoner obsolete in capitalist farming, his inability to set his sons up with a farm of their own, and the apparent lack of expected aid from the state. The power of the ideology of the family has been demonstrated, for example, in work on slavery - it has been shown that slaves were incorporated as ‘the most junior members of the patriarchal family’.74 Much has been written on two things to do with paternalism and patriarchy - firstly, in connection with eighteenth and nineteenth-century Cape Colony and, secondly, with white farmers and their black slaves or workers. Little has been said about late nineteenth-century and early twentieth century relations, especially with the connection between white farmers and white
workers, bywoners, and smaller farmers.75 The urbanisation process undermined the cultural mores, particularly undermining the sense of rural family life on both symbolic and practical levels. One commentator noted poignantly: ‘“Oom” en “tante” moet plek maak vir “Meneer”e n “Mevrou”a s dit nie ‘‘mister”e n “missis”i s t~ie.’ Although often the male head of the family would move to centers like the Rand in search of work, it was frequently the unmarried female members of the family who moved first to the urban areas, further undermining the poor white father as bread winner.‘’


Conclusion

The Rebellion was, in part, the reaction of marginal farmers, bywooners and poor whites to post-war economic changes and dispossession and urbanisation. The existing socioeconomic climate certainly proved a factor in rebellion. Poverty meant change, affecting both class and gender. The rural poor white saw his manhood seeping away. His daughters no longer got married to the young men of his approval, instead they were off to the city to work and send a little money back home. His sons were leaving to look for degrading work in the police or railways, or underground working to bring up gold for the English. He was no longer welcome at the table of wealthier farmers. He was becoming a patriarch without a family. Worse still, he was being removed from the land: the land that gave his life structure. While he suffered, his government debated.

The Labour Party, which had briefly offered hope in terms of radical reform measures, now turned jingoistic in defence of the war effort. Inspired by a messianic profit and the ubi sunt motif of the populist demagogue's speeches, these men went into rebellion to preserve their life-style, to avoid having to sell-up and migrate to the cities and become
labourers. They rebelled to remain Boers.




01-25-2014 12:23 PM
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